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Decentralizing Infrastructure  Decentralization  - or rather
the realization  that the
optimal decisionmaking
For Good or for Ill?  structure in the public sector
is  almost certainly
Richard  Bird  noncentralized  (polycentric)
--  may in principle yield a
more efficient and equitable
pattern of infrastructure
investment and use than the
overcent,alized  and
Background paper for World Development Report 1994  unresponsive  public  sector
found in many developing
countries. But it will do so in
practice only if it is properly
impiemented along the lines
sketched  in this paper.
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Summary  findings
Bird  examines  the many faces  of infrastructure  informed  about the consequences  of all decisions.
decentralization:  the costs  and benefits,  the government  Making  politicians  bear the consequences  of their own
structure  (constraint  or variable?),  the "polycentric"  mistak-s  is as close  as one can get to a "hard" political
approachi,  and how to make  decentralization  work (for  budget constraint.
whom?).  He proposes  basic  principles  and guidelines  for  *  Economically,  it must be difficult  for local residents
policy  design,  for both small  projects  and large.  to shift  costs  to nonresidents  who do not receive  benefits
Broadly,  these guidelines  are summed  up in a few  and to make  Iccal decisionmakers  ful!v responsible  to
propositions:  their citizens  for the use  they make  of revenues  collected
* In all countries,  some critical  infrastructure  is  from them (through  local taxes),  to users  of
provided  through a decentralized  political  structure.  infrastructure  (local  or otherwise)  for the use made  of
Cuirant trends make  that likely  to be more true in the  the reventies  they contribute  (through user charges  of
futire.  various sorts),  and to taxpayers  in general for the use
* Decentralization,  however  defined,  in and of itself  made of any transfers  (or subsidized  loans)  they receive.
has no necessary  implications  for good or evil  so far as  * Administratively,  what such a syscem  requires is a
infrastructure  is concerned:  its effects  depend on the  clear set of "framework"  laws (on local budgeting,
incentives  various decisionmakers  face.  financial  reporting,  taxation. contracting,  dispute
* The key to ensuring  that these incentives  are  settlement,  rules to be followed  in designing  user
conducive  to "good" decisions  (about design,  siting,  charges,  and so on), as well  as adequate institutional
timing,  finance,  pricing,  operation, maintenance,  and use  support for localities  to operate in this environment.
of infrastructure)  is to ensure  that those who made the  To tne extent that these  conditions  are not met, the
decisions  bear the financial  (and political)  consequences,  perverse  incenti'.es  that too often exist because  of the
as much as possible.  strucolre  and finance  of the public sector  in many
* Politically,  this means  that political  leaders  at all  countries  will probably  be exacerbated  by the current
levels  should  be responsive  and responsible  to their  tendency  to decentralize  more and more decisions  in the
constituents,  and that those constituents  are fully  public  sector.
This  paper  - a product  of the Office  of the Vice  President,  Development  Econcnics  - is ont in a series  of background  papers
prepared  for  WorldDevelopment  Report 1994  onI  infrastructure.  Copies  of  the paper  are  available  free  from  the  World  Bank,  1818
H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Pltase  contact  the World  Development  Report  office,  room  T7-1  01,  extenision  31393  (34
pages).  February  1994.
The Policy Resea ch Working Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work  in progress  to encourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development  issues.  An objective  of the  series  is to  get the findings  out quickly,  even  if the presentations  are  less  than  fully polished.  The
papers  carry  the names  of the  authors  and should  be  used  and cited  accordingly.  The  findings,  ;nterpretations,  and conclusions  are the
authors' oun and should  not be  atf-ibuted to the World Bank,  its Executive  Board  of Directors,  or any of its member  countries.
Produced  by the Policy  Research  Dissemination  CenterBackground  Paper  for the 1994 World  Development  Report (forthcoming)
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Investment  in physical  infrastructure  (e.g. water,  sewerage,  roads,  transit,  power,
telecommunications)  has long  been  considered  to be important  for economic  growth.
Indeed, some  of the earlier  writings  on economi(  growth,  like some  of the early  prctices of
agencies  dispensing  foreign  aid, appear  simply  to have  assumed  that investment  in
infastructure  was not only  a necesary but almost  a sufficient  condition  for growth.
Although  subsequent  analysis  and experience  has undermined  this simple  belief,  several
recet  studies  have  again  awakened  interest  in the connection  between  public  sector
investment  in infrastructure  and  private  investment  and economic  growth.'
Whatever  the stren  of the connection  between  infstructure and economic  growth,
infrastructure  investments  almost  invariably  constitute  the core of both  national  and regional
developmet  policy  in most  countries.  Infhstructure  investment  projects,  and the services
they provide,  are inherently  located,in,  and serve, particular  areas and customers  . A road
built  in the middle  of an uninhabited  desert  is not the same  as a road built  in a major  urban
area, even  if the physical  characteristics  of the two projects  - the thickness  of the pavement,
the width  of the roadway,  etc. -are identical. The productivity  (in terms  of growth)  of an
infrastructire  project  thus  depends  largely  upon  its environment  - upon  where  it is located.
Moreover,  location  also  determines  to a considerable  extent  who benefits  from infrastrucure
investment:  water  supply  systems  with  pipes  that serve  only the rich do not do much  for the
poor.  The efficiency  and equity  of  any particular  investment  thus  depends  in part - often  in
large  part - upon  its physical  location. Infrastructure  investment  is thus  invariably  location-
or site-specific.
Infrastructure  investment  is also  jurisdiction-specific.  In principle,  there  are many
alternative  ways  in which ocal  infrastructure  may be provided  (Box  1). Is the project
designed,  financed,  regulated,  operated  and/or maintained  by the national  government?  A
regional  government?  A local  government?  A state  enterprise  or other agency  reporting  to
any of these  governments?  Some  sort of public-private  interaction  (e.g.BOI? 2 How  does
the government  or agency  responsible  for these  different  aspects  of the investment  finmce  its
responsibilities?  To whom  is it accountable,  in what sense,  and how is this accountability
exercised?
Seo, notably,  Aschauer  (1989),  and, for an application  to developing  countries,  World Bank  (1993). As  a aide
point, it appears  that moat  such studies  assume that infrastructure  is provided  to the private sector free of cose this
may  be an  ccurate  depiction  of reality, but it is not a particularly  desirable  state of affairs.
2 There am many possible forms of public-private  interction in the provision  of infrastructur: for a recent
discussion  in the context of a developed  country, see  Bird and Slack (1993), chap. 7, and also Kitchen  (1993).E  S  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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net social benefit of a particular investment and the distribution of its benefits a±id  costs.
Which public infrastructure r .cjects are built,  wher^ they are built,  when they are built, and
how they are operated, mnaij.tained,  and utilized invariably depends largely  upon the way in
which the various public sector institutions involved in the process are organized and
financet  (Bo0x  2).
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as a rule do not pay for them  - waile  at the same  time  the many  pay a large share  of their
small  incomes  for less adequate  (ad  generally  unsubsidized)  versions  of the same  service. 3
To mention  only two common  exampls found  in many  developing  countries:  "free,
university  education  (albeit  usually  in undermaintaLvied  buildings)  for the few and not even
primary  schooling  for the rest; highly-srbsidized  (but  unreliable)  supplies  of piped-water  and
electricity  foi the affluent  suburbe  v' ,AJ  the poor  pay ten times  as much  for even  worse
service  al the other  end of town,  often 1 provided  through  the.  so-called  'informal' sector.
Such common  outcomes  in many  countries  reflect  neither  inevitable  fate ("the  poor
are always  with us") nor dire necessity  but rather  the structure  of institutional  incentives  to
which  decision-makers  at all levels  are reacting. Inappropite incentives  as codified  in the
orgnizational  and financial  structure  of the public  sector, largely  explain  why  the "wrong"
project  seems  so often  to be built  in the 'wrong"  place  (often  at the 'wrong' time), soon  to
deterio-u;e  owing  to lack of adequate  upkeep, while  at the same  time other  projects  that
people  are both wiling and able  to pay for do not get built  -or at least not bv the "official'
public  sector  (Box  3).
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How and to s/hat exetent  the public sector is decentrasezed, and what exactly is meant
by  hdecentralization,l  are  thus critical factors detenrining  the productivity of infhastructure
investhrent in any country.  What infrmastucture  gets built, where,  wen,  to what
'For  various examples, see the papers in Bird  and Horton (1989).8
specifications,  and how  it Is maintained  and utilized,  depends  largely upon  who is
responsible  for these  decisions,  and what "responsibility  means  in this context. The next
two sections  briefly  introduce  some  of the many  dimensions  of decentrlization:  what  is it
(many  things),  why  do so many  people  advomate  it (for many  different  and often  incompadble
reasons),  and what are its imrlications  for infrastructure  (it depends)?  Tae fourth  sectioa  of
the paper  bnefly sketches  a framework  for considenng  infrastructure  investments  in a
decentralized  setting  and, as summarzed  in a brief  concluding  section,  suggests  some  ~,uiding
principles  for dealing  with  the many  and divere issues  that may  arise in practice.
Throughout,  the discussion  in the body of the paper  is .ipported  by a number  of "boxes that
develop  a few aspects  of the argumnent  in more  detail  and illustrate  some  of the points  made
in the text by brief  case studies.
The Many Faces of Decentralization
'Decentralization'  is a slippery  term.  One  way  to pin its mear;ng  down  is to
distinguish  three  varieties  of decentralization  as measured  by the degree  of independent
decision-making  exercised  at the local  leve.  peco,en  means  the dispersion  of
responsibilities  within  a central  government  to regional  branch  offices:  while  clzarly  relevant
with respect  to some  infrastructural  investments,  this variety  of decentralization  is not
fmrther  discussed  here. In contrast, delem  tin  refers to a situation  in which  local
governments  act as agents  for the central  government,  executing  certain  functions  on its
behalf, while  devoluton  refers to a situation  in which  not only  implementation  bnt also the
authority  to decide  what is done  is in the hands  of local  governments.  How one views  the
effects  of decentralization  on infrastructurm  depends  in part upon  whether  one is thinng  of
delegation  or devolution.  Unless  exactly  the same  people  face  cxactly  the same  incentives  in
both situations  - which  iS  hardly  possible  - the outcomes  of the two varieties  of
decentralization  are likely  to differ  shar' y.
The Benefits  and Costs  of Decentalization
How one evaluates  such  differing  outcomes  depends  both upon  the nature  of the
investment  in question  and upon whether  one focuses  on the intnnsic  or the instrumental
aspects  of dcxentralization.  The literature  is replete  with  passages  praising  the virtues  of
decentralization. 4 Not only will  it produce  more efficient  and equitable  service  delivery
through  making  better  use of local  knowledge,  but it will  also lead  to greater  participation
and democracy  resulting  in more  popular  consent  to government  and hence improved
political  stability. When  to these  good qualities  are added  such  further  ascribed  virtues  as
increased  resource  mobilization  and reduced  strain  on central  finances,  greater  accountability,
and more  responsive  and responsible  govemment  in general,  it is not surprising  thiat  some
have  seen decentalization  in and of itself to be intrinsically  valuable.
'  The  particular  list that  follows  is based on the discussion  in four reent  intems. Bank documz a (on Aex.zo,
Nigeria, Indonesia,  and Venezuela,  respectively)  but it could be replicated  many times from many sources.9
Whatever  the precise  outcomes  that may  emerge  from  a decentralized  (in the sense  of
devolved)  system  of decision-making,  from  one pentpective  such  outcomes  must oi presumed
to be satisfactory  simply  because  the process  itself  :s  desirable. Loc  people  may maLe
"wrong decisions  from the perspective  of the central  government  or of an outside  observer,
but if gh= make  them,  the decisions  rtust, by definition,  be assumed  to be  right' for them.
From  this perspective,  decentaization is intrin2ically  good  because  it institutionalizes  the
participation  of  those  affected  by local  decisions,  and the results  of this good  process  must
themselves  be good.
Under  certain  coneitions,  this argument  is persuasive.  The conditions  for successful
decentralizaUon,  however,  are seldom  sufficiently  emphasized.  In their absence
decentraliation  may not only fail to improve  local service  delivery,  but it may carry risks  up
to the level of national  destabiIiza.¢,on.'  If more  expenditure  responsibilitia  than  revenue
resources  are decentralized,  service  levels  will  liklly fall; if more  revenues  than expenditures
are decentralized,  local revenue  mobilization  will  likely  decline;  even  if both sides  of the
budget  are decentalizee'  in a balanced  fashion,  local governments  may not have  adequate
admrn!istative  or technical  capacity  to carry  out their new  functions  in a satisfactory  fashion.
These  problems  may be particularly  marked  with  respect  to infrastructure  owing  to the 'large
ticket nature  of many  projects  and the degree  of technical  competence  required  to carry
them  out (Box  4).
Three conditions  that are particularly  important;  for successful  decentralization  in this
context  are:
[1]  that the local  decision  process  is fully  democratic  in the sense  that the costs and
benefits  of decisions  are transparent  and that everyone  affected  has an equal
opportunity  to influence  the decision;'
(2] that the costs of local de.sions are fiuly  borne  by those  who make  the
decisions,  i.e., there is no 'tax  exporting'  and no funding  at the margin  from
trnsfers from other levels  of government;  and
[3] that the benefits  (like  the costs)  do not 'spiIl over' jurisdictional  boundaies.
s  A  experience  in a number  of ILa  Ameica  coun;Aes  has sugesteod,  this risk is greatest wh  revenues  are
decentrlized without  adeipate steps to enure that  local revenue  mobilization  is maintainod  and thst local authorities
are cpable  of carzring out the correponding expeaditr  responsibilities. Argentina  in the 1980. offers perhaps
the clearest  exam;ple,  but others may be found  in e.g. the Philippines  and in many of the transitional  economies  of
eastern and central Europe (see Bird and Wallich, 1993).
' Given the inevitable  imperfection  of democrtic institudons,  and the ability of the rich and powerful  to come
out on top in most systems, this is obviously  a counsel  of perfection.10
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Even  when  one or more  of these  conditions  does not hold, the delegatin  of
implementation  responsibilities  to local  bodies  may still make  instrumental  sense  provided
that the incentives  facing  local  decision-makers  are properly  structured,  that is, structured  to
produce  the resl!lts  desired  by the central  govemnment  (in its capacity  as representing  th-e
populatioin  as a whole).' In the absence  of the right  incentive  structure,  however,  the effects
7How ths may  be done  has been  discussed  extensively  eLsewhere  e.g. Bird  (1993).11
of either delegadon  or devulution  on the efficiency  and equity of resource allocadon may be
much less beneficial than often alleged (Box 5).
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Government  Structure: Constraint or Vaniable?
To this point, it has been ixnpliciily  assumed that the structure  of local government  is
a policy variable:  that who does what, and under what rules, may be freely determined  by
central policy-makers.  In some instances, however, the structure  of public sector decision-12
maldng is not a variable but a gij=.  Perhaps the most important such case arises in federal
states, in which two levels of government  (national  and state) have specific  and  independent
powers assigned by a constitution  which is not easy to change.  Even apart from formal
federations, however, it is often  difficult to alter governmental  structures quickly,
particularly when, as is usually the case, the existing structure  reflects historically-determined
patterns of power-sharing.'
In such circumstances, the existing degree and pattern of decentralization  in effect
becomes part of the environment  or context within which infrastructure  decisions  must be
made.  When, as is often the case, some of the incentives  resulting from the prevailing  form
of decentralization  are perverse,  careful attention  has to be paid to the extent to which those
incentives  may be altered at the margin without  undertaling major (difficult,  costly, tme-
consuming)  constitutional  (or, perhaps better in formally unitary states,  quasi-
constitutional') reforms.  Even within a given constitutional  structure, however  - even one
with many "wrong" signals being given (Box 5) - there may often be a surprising  amount  of
local discretion in both policy design and policy delivery, for good or for ill (Box 6).
Decentralizing  infrastructure  decisions  in an efficient and effective manner may thus
require very differenat  strategies  in different  circumstances  depending  both upon why this
approach is being taken - for intrinsic (because  it is good) or instrumental (because  it
produces good results) reasons - and upon the perceived  rigidity (or flexibility,  as the case
may be) of  the formal government  structure.
Many other factors must also be taken into account  in assessing the likely effects of a
particular form of decentralization. Each type of infrastructure  investment, for instance, has
its own specific characteristics  (economies  of scale, t&e  identfiability and spatial
concentration  of beneficiaries,  etc.) that may affect the desirable degree and nature of
decentralization  at each stage of the process  - design, finance, construction,  operation,
maintenance,  and utlization.  Moreover, since, as was emphaized earlier, infrastructure
investment  is inevitably  location-specifc,  the local environment  may differ in many relevant
ways: rural vs. urban; large metropolitan  vs. small city; the relative importance  of formal
and informal markets; historical  and political  background;  and so on.  The potential  uses,
effects, and limitations  of different varieties of decentralization  inevimably  differ in response
to these, and other, factors. It is thus singularly  difficult to generalize on this subject, even
within a single country (Box 7), let alone across countries.
I For a recent discussion  of the importance  of such factors, see e.g. Bird (1993a).13
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The wPolycentric'  Aipoach
Matters  may often  be even more  complex  than  this because  the optimal  strategy in
many  cases may  not be wdecentralizationu  in the sense  of establishing  a two- or three-level
hierarchy  of general-purpose  governments,  but ratlher  a noncentda  or "polycentricw
institutional  arrangement  in which  there  is no single,  ultimate  center  of authority  but rather  a
number  of independent  bodies  each  excercising  authority  circumscribed  by rules (as opposed
to superior  authority).' The  private  market  alone  is unlikely  to provide  adequate
infrastructure  in part because  the phenomenon  of *free-ridingw  makes  it impossible  to realize
economies  of scale. Centralized  provision  may overcome  these  problems  but it also often
results  in misplaced  and misspecified  investments  owing  to its inability  to take  adequately
' This concept is most fully developed  in Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne  (1993),  chapter 9.14
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into account  place-specific  information.d  Decentc alized provision  intended  to overcome
these  problems  in turn  has  seldom  succeeded  and  has  given  rise  to  its  own  problems  -
corruption,  mismanagement,  rent-seeldng,  and  so on.  Indeed,  there  are  probably  as many
papers  in  the literature  decrying  the limitations  of fiscal  and  administrative  decentralization  as
"I  See Box 2.  This argument  assumes  that  it is more  economical  (requires  lower tansactions costs)  to aggregate
information  on local conditions  and  preferences  at local than at central levels  of government. This  proposition  may
be correct, although  it is (so far  s I low)  unteste  d, but it should be noted that it implies that  ch  informatio
could be gathered  at the center  if sufficient  effort was made to do so.  Moreover, if the relative  costs of acquiring
information  at different  scales change  over  time - as seems  likely - then the comparative  advantage  of carrying  out
different activities  at different  levels  of government  will also change (as emphasized  by e.g. Breton, 1989).15
a solution  to the problems of developing  countries as there are papers propounding its
virtues.' 1
In contrast to this linear view of the possibilities  - private, decentralized  public, or
centralized  public - what may really be ideal might be, in effect, a different  govemment'
for every relevant  public',  that is, for every group affected  by a common  problem.  In
some  instances, the best solution may be to leave the problem to the market; in others, to
form some  sort of  'club',  or some form of  joint public-private  organization; in still others
to create a single-purpose  jurisdiction,  or to form an association  of different general-purpose
jurisdictions (Box 1).
Of course, the more jurisdictions there are, the higher the tansactions costs will be
and, all too often, the more obscure the lines of accountability.  Single-purpose  jurisdictions
(such as water districts and school boards), for example, may be appealing  on efficiency
grounds in terms of providing the specific  service with which they are concerned. But at the
same time, they may undesirably weaken  general-purpose  local governments  both in terms of
competition  for resources and reduced political accountability  and hence hamper the efficient
provision  of other public services.1 2
When this rich palette of institutional  possibilities  is applied to the diverse settings
already mentioned, the optimal results, although  in theory presumably  limited only by one's
imagination,  in practice will depend  primarily upon three factors:
[1] the importance attached to various criteria (minimizing  resource
costs, economic growth, poverty alleviation,  participation,  etc.);
[2] the nature of the infrastructure  investment  (economies  of scale, span of
benefit, etc.); and
[3] the political, economic, and institutional  environment  of the country or
region in question.
It is obviously  not possible in a short paper to consider  all of the possibly relevant
combinations  of these factors, so most of the following  discussion  will assume (1) that the
major concern  is to promote economic  growth (with some  attention, however, to poverty
alleviation  and participation), and (2) that there are two classes of investment (small or local
" See, for example,  the introductory overview  in United  Nations  (1991).
1 2 Kitchen  (1993), for example,  in a rocent examination  of Canadian  experience  with special-purpose  districts
concludes  that (1) they make govemment more difficult for citzcns  to understand;  (2) they reduce the degree of
control citizens  have over government;  (3) they reduce accountability  and hence, probably, the overall efficiency
of resource allocation  in the public sector; and (4) they appropriate  significant  proportions  of revenue that would
otherwise  accrue to local governments.16
and large, as defined  below).  In addition,  the discussion  could  easily  be extended  to
accommodate  two types  of countries  (federal  and unitary)  and two types  of regions  (urban
and rural), but this is not really  essential:  the federal/unitary  distinction  has already  been
noted, and the urban/rural  distinction  may to some  extent  be subsumed  under  the small/large
distinction. ITis simple  taxonomy  is more  than complex  enough  for this preliminary  look  at
some of the implications  of decentralization  for infrastructural  investment.
Inrastructure  For Whom?
The answer  to the question  in the title of this section  may seem  obvious:  for the
'people.'  The problem,  however,  is that there  are often two distinct  and potentially
relevant  groups  of  people  - those  who  benefit  and those  who pay.  Only  when  the two
completely  coincide  is the answer  obvious. At one extreme,  those  investments  that  benefit
all national residents equally - that  are truly Opublic  goods  - and are paid for out of national
taxes levied  by a democratically-elected  government  that is fully accountable  for its actions
should  clearly  be provided  by the national  government." At the other extreme,  when  the
public  goods  aspects  of the provision  (nonexcludabllity)  and financing  (user charges)  of
infrastructare  are small,  when  there  is little  or no redistributional  concern,  and when  the
spatial  clusteing of beneficiaries  is marked, the investment  should  be provided  by the most
efficient  (least-cost)  form  of organization  that can aggregate  local preferences  and collect
local contributions  - a voluntary  club,  a cooperative  or non-governmental  agency,  a special
district, a  local or regional  governrment,  or some  combination  of the preceding,  as the case
may be (Box 1).
Unfortunately  for analytical  simplicity,  most  infrastructure  does  not fall cleanly  into
either of these  extreme  categories.  Distributing  water  to residences  and businesses  may  be a
purely local concern,  but supplying  the water to the distribution  system  is, except  in small
rural communities,  almost  always  a matter  of regional  concern. Similarly,  maintaining  the
airways  (air traffic  control,  etc.) may  be a national  problem,  but regional  and local  interests
are greatly conceined  with  the location  and characteristics  of airports. Even  when  an
infrastructure activity appears to be obviously  local - for example, the provision of sewerage
facilities  - there may  be overriding  concerns  (e.g. public  health)  that in principle  require
higher-level  governments  to intervene  in a regulatory  or supervisory  fashion.
For these  reasons,  the only  possible  answer  to the question  posed  in the title  of this
section  is: it depends.  It depends  on what infrastructure,  on why it is being  provided  (at
whose  behest),  on how  it is being  paid for, and, in some  instances,  on where  it is located
(where  in the watershed  or air basin  the facility  is located,  for example).
" Possible  examples  might be  a national  telecommunications  satellite or the maintence  of  the airways.17
How  to Make  Decentralization  Work
To the extent  local people  decide  to carry out some  activity  through  an organiizational
structure  that they form or that is under  their  control,  annd  they  bear the fiull  costs of their
decision,  they should  be free, even  encouraged,  to do so.  Of course,  there may remain
many  potential  problems  even  with such  small  groups  e.g. enforcing  accountability,
preventing  shirkcing,  and so on (Box  8).  But on the whole  it is probably  not misleading  to
say that the more  decentralized  the decision  structure  in such  instances,  the better the
infrastructure  should  be from the only  point  of view  that matters  - namely,  that of the local
beneficiaries  (and  payors).
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countries  owing  to the lack  of experience  at local  levels  and the difficulty  of figuring  out who
the likely  beneficiaries  of projects  are going  to be, let alone  making  them  pay for what they
get.  In fact,  however,  in many  countries  it appears  that  even  the poorest  people  opeating
informally,  within  the severely  limited  conditions  open  to them, can sometimes  manage  to
provide  the local  public  services  that they  want and are willing  to pay for but that they
cannot  obtain  from the established  (and  usually  much  too centralized)  provision  system  (Box18
3)."4 Experience thus suggests  that at least in some cases the obstacles  can be overcome,  at
least with respect to small-scale  activities.'5
What is needed to get the right infrastructure for the right people in these
circumstances, whether they are located  in remote rumral  areas or metropolitan  slums, i-
essentially to provide mechanisms  by which their wishes can becomc reality.  Three steps
seem essential in this regard:
[1] to ensure that fiscal, financial  and political accountability  is both transparent  and
enforced (Box 8);"6
[2] to provide a mechanism  (e.g. a  uousted  court system) for resolving  any disputes
that may arise within the local service unit (or, conceivably, when there are boundary
problems, between  units); 17 and
[3] to provide adequate  technical  support (e.g. access to engineering  and project
design and administration  skills) to enable small units to carry out projects
efficiently."
None of these tasks is easy, and, as already suggested, they become  even more
difficult when there are significant  benefit or cost spillovers  or when the redistributional
1"  Perhaps  the most detailed  account of this process at work is de Soto (1989); see  also Jekin  (1988) and
Ostrom,  Schroeder  and Wynne  (1993).
1 Of  course,  small-scale  activities  may  add up to be big ones:  Jenkins  (1988,  p.20),  for example,  reports  that
small  'informal' suppliers  provide  93  percent  of urban  mass  transit  facilities  in Lima.
"I  For a more  extensive  discussion  of accountability  in generl, se  Paul (1991)  and on fiscal  accountability,
see Bird (1993). See also the interesting  discussion  of the need to develop  forml evaluation  u  a mean of
accountability  in Wiesner  (1993). Although  Wienr  (1993)  appear in part to see evaluation  as an alternative  to
decentralization  as a way  of  improving  public  sector  efficiency,  I would  soe  it more  as a necessary  complement  (Box
14). Effective  decentralization  depends  upon  improved  accountability,  and formal  reporting  and  evaluation  systems
constitute  essential  components  of any  workable  accountability  system  -whether  to users,  to local  taxpayers,  or to
the  central  govemment,  depending  upon  the  source  of financing.  In Wiesncr's  words  (1993,  p.  16) 'the  nature  and
source of financing  is the crucial  detemina  of efficiency' but, a  he also emphaizes  (p.18), a system  of
independent  and  well-publicized  assssment  is required  not  just for  accountability  but also,  often  more  importantly,
to help  establish  a 'public' to whom  to be accountable.
1 7A  ll too often,  a well-founded  lack  of tuSt in formal  political  (and  judicial)  institutions  is one  reason  why
community  'slf-help' organization  have  developed  to provide  local  public  services,  including  infrstur:  for
examples,  see de Soto  (1989)  and  Jenkins  (1988).
" Note that ther is of course  no presumption  that small  local agencies  will themselves  actually  e.g. design
water  systems;  the point  is rather  that  they  must  have  access  to specialized  and knowledgable  private  (or public)
agencies  that  can  do  so for  them  (Box  4). In this  connection,  it is of course  especially  important  to keep  the  process
as open  and accountable  as possible  (see  Wiesner  (1993)  and sources  cited there).19
aspects  of infrastructural  investment  are important.  Again,  however,  the principles  of good system  design  are relatively  obvious,  and more  or less  identical  to those  in the 'smallW  local infrastructure  ctse just discussed. B;sically,  the idea  is that  while  local residents  should
again finance - through user clarge-  (Box 9) or locally-borne  taxes - the costs of designing, building,  operating,  and maftitaining  facili  .es tW  the extert that they  receive  the benefits, regional  or national  governments  (as the cse may  be) should  assume  the balance  of the cost - that  is, 'their share' of  the benefits  spilling  over. Locally,  taxes,  like transfers  from the central  government,  are often  earmarked  for investment.  As Box  10 notes,  however,  this common  practice  is usually  not a good idea.
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13). Why  should  they fund  the maintenance  of something  that all too often  they did not want
in the first  place?  - especially  since, 311  too often, they  can  count  on the central  government
to come  to the  rescue  agaLn  if things  get bad enough. Ausa,what  is needed  isto face  all
relevant  decision-makers  with a sufficiently  whard budget  constraint.  Provid  .d
accountability  is again  taunsparent  (and  there is an accepted  dispute  resolution  mecbaism), if
the prices  facinlg  decision-makers  at all levels  from the indivridual  to the national  government
are  rightw  in this sense, the  results  should  beas good  as canbheachieved.
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resource  allocation,  let alone  to work out what is likely  to be adminlistratively  and politically
feasible  in the circumstances  of a particular  investment  in a particular country.  In federal
countries,  for instance,  the scope  for creative  institutional  design may be much more
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restlicted with respect to federal-state  interaction than at the state-local  level, particularly
wvhen  states rmPre  ont  real difference in valuo  and experiences (e.g.  there are linguistic
difference-).  Even with respect to the Esimplem  cas  of purely local infrastructure,  the
possibility of building on indigenous infonmal organizations to provide local infrastructure in
an efficient and  qui.u  ble  E  shimon  my  be much greater  in a traditional rural commueity  cnti
in a dynamically changing metropolitan area.2o
Guidelines for Policy Design.
Thc  essential  frmework  for  policy  design  with  respect  to  the decentrazed  provision
of infastructure  thus basically amounts to little more than the familar econor ic dictum "Get
the Pr,ices RighLt"  In terms  perhaps  more familiar in the public sector, this may be
tanslated  as 'Impose  a Hard Budget Constaaint",  i.e.  face aU decision-makers at tlte margin
X It is perhaps  not entirely  due to the terms  of reference  of the research  project  on which  it is based  that  the
stimatin  c  boomr  by Octrom,  Schroeder,  and  Wynd  e (1993)  deals  solely  with  nni  are  ls.23
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,1] Ensure  to the extent  possible  that who benefits,  pays;
',2]  Do so in part  by making  the lines  of accountability  (the  rules, or incentives)  as
ransparent  as possible;  and
(3]  Proiide some  enforcement  mechanism  to ensure  that the system  workcs  as it should
(Box 14,.
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Purely Lccal Projects
So far as  purely local  infrastructure  projects are concerned, they should clearly be
financed to the extent possible on benefit  lines, that is, by appropriately-designed  user
charges where suitable and otherwise  by local taxes, where  local taxes  are understood to be
those borne by local residents (the presumed  beneficiary  group).  Pgvided  there is a
responsible  and accountable local political  structure  (Box 8), the results in terms of both the
efficiency  and equity aspects of infrastructural  decisons should be as economically  and
politically  good as can be hoped for.  Only those  projects will be built that people are willing
to pay for, and when they are built they will be adequately  maintained  so long as people are
willing to pay for it; moreover, if the correct prices are charged, the projects will be
efficiently  maintained and utilized.?
Of course, this simple picture conceals  many potential  problems.  One concerns the
distributional  aspect of infrstructure.  Lally-&dered  demands for distribution may readily
be accommodated  through the siting of projects,  their design, precisely how they are
fiaced,  etc. - but only to the extent such demands  are effectively  articulated through the
local political structure.  If that structure  is captured  by the better-off, as may often be the
case in practice, and if there is a national  concern  (articulated  through the presumably more
heterogeneous  national political structure)  for a more  redistributive delivery and/or finaicing
system,  the national government  may attempt  to satisfy that concern in a number of ways -
e.g. by restricting the extent to which projects  can be financed through user charges or by
mandating  certain service delivery patterns. Unless  the national government  pays for any
excess  costs its requirements  place on local power-holders,  however,  the result of such
interference will be tJ  reduce the efficiency  with which the noncentralized  public sector
decides on and delivers infrastructumal  services.
Another concern is how to ensure the transparency  and accountability  of local political
bodies.  Local authorities should  not, for example,  be able to 'export  any of the costs of
their decisions to persons to whom they are not politically  accountable. Their access to taxes
on businesses  that trade outside their jurisdiction  should  therefore be restricted whenever
possible.'  Political and administrative  mechanisms  for public accountability  - e.g. making
the books open or setting up watchdog  agencies  of various sorts - need to be in place (see
Box 14). Whenever possible, infrastructure  projects should  proceed only when there is a
clear decision by a politically responsible  body as to exactly how their construct!on  and
1  For further  discussion  of the  choice  of local  taxes,  and  of various  vareties of user charge.,  see Bird  (1993,
pp. 212-14).  Such recommendations  are of course  not uncommon  in the literaturr: but what should perhaps be
emphaizad is how very sldom  they have been followed  in practice.
For examples  of the  nks stressed in the text, see Brent (1993) and Box 13.
D Tbis  common  recommendation,  like most suggestions  for increased  transparency, is morm  honoured in the
breach than the observance:  all the incentives  for politicians,  both local and national, ae  to conceal what is going
on.  Too often, obscurity, not trnsparency, is the key to political  success26
maintenance  are to be financed. Where the projects are big enough, this requirement  may
call, for example, for a spezial  voting or other approval procedure.
Finally, anyone  contemplating  letting small (or even large) subnational  agencies  make
their own investment  decisions  in the circumstances  of most developing countries  must also
be prepared to invest substantial  resources in 'backstopping' such agencies  by giving them
adequate access to e.g. technical  skill in designing, financing, and managing  the construction
and operation of infrastructure  (Box  4).  There is no need for such aid to be provided by a
specific central  ofrregional  agency, of course: local bodies can and should  be encouraged  to
contract such assistance  privately, to hire it from other, more experienced  public sector
agencies, or, if it is appropriate,  to contract with a central or regional  agency  experienced  in
the particular field (Box  7). But they should be  to  pepare projects in a professional
manner, to report on their execution  and operation in a transparent fashion (Box 14), and to
bear the consequences  (political  and economic)  of any mistakes they make in these respects.
It may of course be easier to enforce some of these requirements  when some of the
fmancing comes directly  from a superior level of government - see below - but in general
what seems required for success  in this approach to decentralizing local physical
infrastructure  is to create four pieces of institutional  infrastructure:
[1] A local finance law that provides access to local (ngt non-local)  revenues  in
sufficient  quantity  and that also requires regular and uniform financial  reporting both
to the local citizens  and to independent  auditing and evaluation  authorities  (Box 14);
[2] A political  structure  that provides for adequate local financial  and political
accountability;
[3] Adequate  institutional  infrastructure  to support and develop the capacity  of
localities  to operate in the environment  sketched  above.
[4] Acceptance  at the national (and international  financial  institution)  level that what
local governments  (or other local actors) choose to do with their own funds is their
own lookout:  there should  be no  Father' who either knows best or rescues Junior
from the consequences  of his (or her) own mistakes.
While it is unlikely  that  yaY  country in the world today fully satisfies  these conditions,
if the general line of argument  made here is accepted, it is these matters - building
institutional  capacity  to support and operate responsive  and responsible  local governments,
establishing  adequate  'rules of the game 3 for local finances, and ensuring  that the desired
degrees of local participation  in local political institutions  and of the political  responsibility  of
those institutions  are achieved  - that  require attention  if political, administrative,  and fiscal
decentralization  is to produce  better and more sustainable  decisions  with respect to
infrastructure.27
'Su2rLocale  Proiects
Even if all of the above conditions  are satisfied,  when the benefits of infrastructural
investment  spill over local boundaries,  decentralized  decision-making  can produce the 'right'
results in the absence of intervention  from above only in very special circumstances. If, for
example, only two or three contiguous  jurisdictions  are involved, particularly if there is some
reciprocity of benefit or cost flows,  voluntary  agreements  may approximate to the efficient
result (Box 15).Y When more  jurisdictions,  or less clearcut reciprocal gains, are involved,
however, the costs of reaching an acceptable  agreement  may often to outweigh the benefits
from doing so.  The traditional solution  to this problem is to call in a 'higher  level of
government. But how can one obtain the benefits  of doing so (i.e., taldng extermalities  into
account)  without incurring the costs (i.e., imposing  undesired  uninformities)? The answer is,
broadly, that an optimal result may, at least in principle, be achieved by designing an
apprupriate system of national (or regional)  matching  grants (Box 11) and, within this
framework, allowing the non-central  authorities  to make the decisions. 25
Once again, the first requirement  for successfully  Carrying  out jurisdiction-specific
investments  with extrajurisdictional  spillovers  is to ensure that to the extent local benefits are
reaped, local beneficiaries  pay for them, whether  through  user charges or current or future
local taxes.  Applying the same principle to those  benefits that spill over, wherever  possible
users (mdividuals  or communities  as the case may  be) should  pay for what they get, baring
some  overriding distributional  reason - to be covered from general national revenues - as to
why they should be relieved of this burden. Where this is not possible, or it would not be
efficient to do so - for example, because of problems  in identifying  and collecting from
beneficiaries  - the 'nonlocal'  portion  of the project could be financed by matching  grants.
To be effective 'incentive-revealing  mechanisms'  such grants (loans) should be
designed and administered  in accordance  with the following  principles:
[1] Recipients should be required to prepare  adequate plans with respect to (a) the
design of the project; (b) its subsequent  operation  and maintenance; and (c) its
financing (including,  where appropriate,  pricing policy).
(2] Assuming  that the qualified  projects eligible  exceed the available financing,
priorities should be assigned  in accordance  with the assessment by the financing
authority (which is of course responsible  to its own taxpayers for the use made of
2 As Box 15  uggests, voluntay agreemts  may also be used to s4divide  local governments  into relevant
benefit  aras.
25  Of course, if the central govemment  really  wants  something  done (even something  with purely local effects)
it may either do it itself or, if it makes sense  to delegate  operational  responsibiliy, it may pay the entire cost either
directly or through a cost-reimbursement  grant.28
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their  money)  of the need  for the project  and of the capacity  of the recipient  to execute
and finance  itY2
t3] Information  asymmetry  works  both ways: the central  government  does  not know
~bai  to do, the local  government  does not kcnow  hbe to do it.  The granting  authority
(or other  appropriate  agency)  should  stand  ready  to provide  such  technical  assistance
as may  be needed  in developing  investment  plans, arranging  financing  plans,
managing  construction,  and maintaining  the facility  once  constructed.  It may also
assist  localities  in assessing  their  future  infrastructure  needs  e.g. by helping  survey  the
condition  of existing  infrastructure.
X Both need and capacity  should  ie  takecn  into accounte  for further  disusion  Of  the design  of n2thing  (and
other) transfers:  cec  Bird and Wallich  (1992).29
(4] In the absence of shared goals, the granting authority should also monitor and
evaluate the progress of projects, requiring  progress reports, perhaps making field
inspections, and conducting  periodic  evaluations  of outcomes in order to improve its
procedures, assist applicants, and better assess their capacity to carry out their
promises and the extent to which they are carried out (Box 14).  A credible
enforcement mechanism  is needed to ensure that the contract explicit (or implicit)  in a
matching  grant is carried out.
The similarity of some of these requirements  to the sort of institutional  support noted earlier
to be essential for successful  decentralizion  of purely local infrastructure investment
decions  is, of course, not a coincidence.'  The costs of monitoring  intergovernmental
tnsactions  is not small and must be explicitly  taken into account  in designing  and
implementing  decentralization  policies.
The principles just staed apply to all intergovernmental  financial  assistance for
specific  investment  projects.  What they do not and cannot  indicate is just how much
assistance should be provided to whom for what. To make such principles operational  in any
particular country, a good deal of work would have to be done e.g. to identify as best as
possible the proportion of the cost of partcular projects that should be borne by other than
local residents.  In addition, since both the willingness  (price-elasticity)  and the ability
(income-eJasticity)  of different  communities  to contribute  the locally-financed  proportion will
vary with the nature of the project and the wealth  and interests of the community,  an
'equalization  component  may be needed  even in a strictly project-oriented  matching  grant
program, thus further complicating  the design of such programs. 2 '
Conclusion
it is difficult to draw very sharp conclusions  from the rather diffuse exposition of principles
and examples  relating infrastructure  and decentralization  that has been presented in this
paper.  On the whole, however, the moral of the story this paper tries to tell nay perhaps  be
summed  up in a few short propositions,  as follows:
z At this  point  - or sooner  -some  might  say: if all this effort  will be needed  to make  dectralization work,
why bother? Why not simply  eate a single  national  agency  to, say, provide  water or power, saff it with
competent  technicins,  allow  it to set its prices  properly  (providing  from  budgetary  revenues  any socially-required
shortfall),  and let it do the  job?  Not only will  the danger  of political  interference  and technical  and financial
mismanagement  be reduced  by this approach,  but it is obviously  much  easier  for an agency  like the  World  Bank
to dtal with  a single  professional  instiution  than  with  lOOs  or 1000s  of less-qualified  local  agencies.  This  line  of
thought  is tempting  - but it is also  of course  precisely  tlk:  slippeay  path  of overcentralized,  unresponsive  decision-
making  from  which  so many  countries  are trying,  however  imperfectly,  to redeem  themselves  by various  forms  of
decentralization.  For a detailed  evaluation  and critique  of the 'professional'  approach  to infmstniture  provision
and the ensuing  ills of 'functional  fragmentation,'  see Bird  (1980), pp. 28-32.
2 See  Feldstein  (1975)  and Bird  and Wallich  (1992).30
[1] In all countries, some critical infrastructure is provided  through  a decentralized
political  structure. Moreover, cunrent trends in many countries  make it likely that
this will be even more true in the future.  It is therefore important  to understand  the
relation  between  infrastructure and decentralization.
[2] The first thing to be understood about this relation is that decent;alization,
however  defined, in and of itself has no necessary implications  for good or evil so far
as infrastructure  is concerned: its effects  depend upon the incentives  facing  the
various decision-makers  in the decentralized structure.
[3] The key to ensuring that these incentives are conducive  to 'good  decisions  with
repIect to the design, siting, timing, finance, pricing, opration,  maintenance,  and
utilization  of infrastructure  is to ensure that to the greatest  extent  possible  those who
make the decisions  bear the financial (and political) consequences.
[4] Politically,  what this means is that political leaders at all levels should  be
responsive  and responsible to their constituents,  and that those constituents  are fully
informed  about the consequences  of their (and their leaders') decisions. Making
politicians  bear the consequences  of their own mistakes  is as close as one can get to a
'hard  political  budget constraint.'
[5] Economically,  what is required is to make it difficult  for local residents to shift
costs to nonresidents  who do not receive benefits and to make local decision-makers
fully responsible  to their citizens for the use they make of revenues  collected  from
them (through  local taxes), to users of infrastructure, local or otherwise  for the use
made  of the revenues they contribute (through user charges  of various sorts), and to
taxpayers  in gener?l for the use made of any transfers (or subsidized  loans) they
receive.
[6] Administratively,  what such a system requires is a clear set of 'framework' laws
(on local budgeting, financial  reporting, taxation, contracting,  dispute  settlement,
rules to be followed  in designing user charges, etc.), as well as adequate  institutional
support  for localities  to operate in this environment.
It is of course much easier to lay down such general prescriptions  than to satisfy them
in the very diverse  situations  found in the real world.  Nonetheless, to the extent that these
conditions  are not met,  the perverse incentives that too often already exist owing to the
structure  and finance  of the public sector in many countries seem all too likely  to be
exacerbated  by the current tendency to decentralize more and more decisions  in the public
sector. Decentralization  - or, perhaps better, the realization  that the optimal  decision-making
structure  in the public sector is almost certainly polycentric  (non-centralized)  in nature - may
>  For further  discussion,  see Ismel  (1987) and  Wiesner (1993).31
in principle yield a more efficient and equitable  pattern of infrastructure investment  and use
than the overcentralized  and unresponsive  public sector found in many developing  counties.
But it will do so in practice only if it is properly implemented,  along the lines sketched  here.
I ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~ ~  ~ ~  ~32
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